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1. Introduction
Investor relations is a management discipline that
first came to prominence in the US but which has
gained increasing importance in the UK over the
past two decades. Both of these countries possess
significant equity markets and accounting has
been oriented towards the decision making needs
of investors. In both countries investor relations
professionals have formed their own associations.
The UK Investor Relations Society was founded in
1980. In the US the National Investor Relations
Institute (NIRI), which was formed in 1969, has
defined investor relations as:
‘... a strategic management responsibility using
the disciplines of finance, communication and
marketing to manage the content and flow of
company information to financial and other con-
stituencies to maximise relative valuation.’
(NIRI, 2002)
Understanding investor relations helps in our un-
derstanding of the operation of capital markets.
Rao and Sivakumar (1999) reported that the num-
ber of US Fortune 500 companies with IR depart-
ments rose from 16% to 56% in the period 1984 to
1994 and more recently Bushee and Miller (2005)
commented on the lack of academic research into
the investor relations process. Accordingly, they
used interviews, a web-based opinion survey of in-
terviewees and empirical testing (using data exter-
nal to the firm) in their study of investor relations,
firm visibility and investor following in the US.
This paper contributes to the literature by pre-
senting, discussing and analysing results of survey
research in 2002 into the practice of investor rela-
tions, especially investor relations meetings, in the
UK. The survey research results contained both
numerical data (allowing a cross-sectional model-
ling approach) and ranking scale data on percep-
tions of and opinions about investor relations.
Both types of data enable us to explain more about
investor relations in the context of the investor re-
lations and disclosure literature and the two-di-
mensional model derived from the literature. A
unique contribution of this paper is the availability
of comparative survey data from 1991 which en-
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ables an examination of changes over time.
The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 re-
views the literature relating to investor relations in
general and to investor relations meetings in par-
ticular and develops a dynamic two-dimensional
model placing investor relations in context in the
capital markets. In Section 3 this model is used to
derive the research questions. Section 4 discusses
the research approach taken in this project in order
to collect data about investor relations meetings. In
Section 5 the results relating to the individual re-
search questions are presented, discussed and
analysed. Section 6 contains a discussion and con-
clusions.
2. Literature review and two-dimensional
model
This review considers research into investor rela-
tions paying particular reference to the establish-
ment of a theoretical framework within the
disciplines of accountancy and finance (broadly
defined). The theoretical framework is delineated
by a two-dimensional model (see Figure 1) draw-
ing on insights from the literature.
2.1. The company’s disclosure position and 
drivers of change
Investor relations is a multi-disciplinary man-
agement function but one main theoretical ap-
proach for studying the subject has been disclosure
theory. In this approach, investor relations is
viewed as a method or type of disclosure.
Disclosure theory research has differentiated be-
tween mandated and voluntary disclosures. Healy
and Palepu (2001) identified six hypotheses relat-
ing to managers’ voluntary disclosure decisions:
the capital markets transaction/cost of capital hy-
pothesis, the corporate control contest hypothesis,
the stock compensation hypothesis, the litigation
cost hypothesis, the management talent signalling
hypothesis and the proprietary cost hypothesis. All
of the above hypotheses have implications for the
investor relations function. Investor relations as an
activity is voluntary although much of the content
of the disclosure is based on mandatory disclo-
sures. Voluntary disclosure of additional non-
mandatory information via the investor relations
function has been increasingly constrained by 
regulations on the disclosure of price sensitive in-
formation. However, once non-mandatory infor-
mation has been disclosed to the market it may be
discussed and explained via the investor relations
function.
A corporate disclosure strategy (Figure 1, Box 1)
(see Lev, 1992 and Eccles and Mavrinac, 1995)
may involve the establishment and upgrading of
the investor relations function (Box 2).
Healy and Palepu (2001) discuss the importance
of the credibility of voluntary disclosure. If disclo-
sures are credible they will have market outcomes
(Box 4) and an effect on variables such as stock
price and may lead to analysts’ forecast revisions
and increased accuracy of forecasts. A competent
professional investor relations function may be
used to enhance the credibility of company disclo-
sure.
A framework for the management of corporate
disclosure was developed by Gibbins et al. (1990).
Their findings indicated that a firm’s readiness to
disclose is a function of its developed ‘disclosure
position’ (Box 1). This can be considered in terms
of ‘ritualism’, ‘opportunism’ and ‘antecedents’.
Ritualism is defined as a relatively stable prefer-
ence for the way disclosure is managed so firms
tend to adhere to prescribed norms of disclosure.
Opportunism is the propensity to seek firm specif-
ic advantages in the disclosure of information.
Internal antecedents include the firm’s history of
disclosure, corporate strategy and corporate poli-
tics. External antecedents include rules, industry
norms and market position of the firm. Variables
related to opportunism and antecedents change
over time and act as change drivers.
Self-seeking behaviour by managers is also an
issue affecting the disclosure position. Hong and
Huang (2005) employed mathematical modelling
to show that insiders invest resources in investor
relations not necessarily to improve the share
price, but to enhance the liquidity of their own
block of shares.
Building on the disclosure literature and taking a
qualitative grounded theory approach, Holland
(2004) investigated the demand and supply side
determinants of the disclosure agenda and estab-
lished the central role of the value-creation ‘story’
in disclosure. The investor relations function can
assist in crafting this story.
Rao and Sivakumar (1999) considered investor
relations from the standpoint of institutional theo-
ry. They noted the ‘boundary spanning’ nature of
investor relations and traced the rise of investor re-
lations in the 1980s. They suggested that ‘coercive
pressures’ from the investor rights movement
would lead to the establishment of investor rela-
tions departments in US firms. Additionally pres-
sures from financial analysts acting as
professionals and watchdogs were expected to in-
fluence investor relations department formation
(Figure 1, link between Box 1 and 2). ‘Mimetic in-
fluences’ were also expected to lead to the estab-
lishment of investor relations departments. ‘Board
interlocks’ with prior adopters of investor relations
departments and the number of adopters within the
firm’s industry were considered likely to lead to
adoption of an investor relations department.
Empirical testing of their model gave support to
their hypotheses (Table 1).
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2.2. Explanations for disclosure actions of the 
investor relations function
Several studies (Marston, 1993; Lang and
Lundholm, 1993; Tasker, 1998; Frankel et al.,
1999; Gelb, 2000; Bushee et al., 2003) have at-
tempted to explain investor relations activity and
disclosure (Box 3). The studies make use of vari-
ous theories and hypotheses discussed by Myers
(1977), Diamond (1985), Verrecchia (1990), Lev
and Penman (1990), Healy and Palepu (2001),
Skinner (1995) and Lev (1996). Each study takes a
different approach and most of them also refer to
prior empirical studies (e.g. Clarkson et al., 1994;
Ruland et al., 1990; Frankel, et al., 1995; in creat-
ing their model. Table 1 illustrates the wide diver-
sity of dependent and explanatory variables used
(with up to 13 in one model) and results obtained.
Bushee et al. (2003) consider that the existence
of ‘complex information disclosures’ means that
companies will hold closed conference calls with
experts rather than open calls. The idea that ‘com-
plex information disclosures’ drive the need for in-
vestor relations disclosure or a particular type of
investor relations disclosure is reflected in many of
the other models. For example, Tasker (1998)
looks at whether less informative financial state-
ments lead to a need for conference calls and uses
industry level market-to-book as one proxy for
this. Size itself, although often relegated to the role
of a control variable, can also be viewed as a proxy
for complexity. The existence of complex informa-
tion disclosures is likely to exacerbate information
asymmetry and this is reflected in the models that
include intangibles or market to book values.
Table 1 provides evidence that differing levels of
investor relations activity/disclosures can be ex-
plained by disclosure and institutional theories al-
though the evidence is mixed and theoretical
approaches differ between authors. The measures
of investor relations activity in these studies (apart
from Marston, 1993) are obtained by external ob-
servation to the firm and this provides a motivation
for further investigation of internally provided
measures in the light of new theoretical perspec-
tives.
2.3. Studies testing whether investor relations has
any effect/market outcome
Investor relations disclosures, if they are credi-
ble, should have an effect or market outcome
(Figure 1, Box 4) of some kind. Brennan and
Tamarowski (2000) argue that a firm’s information
disclosure policy should enable it to influence the
extent of analyst following. They also note that ‘a
firm’s disclosure policy is perhaps the most signif-
icant aspect of its investor relations management’.
They review the literature relating to investor rela-
tions, liquidity and stock prices. Their review
shows that investor relations activities reduce the
cost of information to analysts and lead to a greater
analyst following. Their empirical evidence shows
that analyst following increases a stock’s liquidity
in the US. Thus by an indirect route they demon-
strate an effect for investor relations.
Empirical studies by Walmsley et al. (1992),
Farragher et al. (1994), Lang and Lundholm
(1996), Brooks et al. (1997), Francis et al. (1997),
Frankel et al. (1999), Bushee et al. (2003) and
Bushee and Miller (2005) investigate the effect of
various investor relations actions on several vari-
ables. Table 2 summarises the positive and nega-
tive results obtained.
On balance it appears from the above evidence
that investor relations disclosures do have an effect
and this implies that they are credible to partici-
pants in the capital markets. Peasnell et al. (2005)
noted however that ‘the market-related conse-
quences of corporate investor relations activity re-
main an unresolved empirical issue.’ In their study
they found that low confidence in accounting cred-
ibility post Enron also damaged confidence in in-
vestor relations contrary to anecdotal evidence that
good investor relations protects companies in peri-
ods of market crisis.
2.4. Market feedback and company learning
Roberts et al. (2006: 278) noted that institution-
al ownership in the UK has become much more
concentrated than it was 20 or 30 years ago and
they therefore suggested that investors have been
given ‘both the opportunity and the need to active-
ly manage their relationship with companies’.
They applied the theories of Foucault to suggest
that meetings between companies and fund man-
agers remind managers of their primary objective,
the pursuit of shareholder value (Figure 1, Box 6).
Their analysis pursued the ‘theme of meetings as
an exercise of discretionary power’ and developed
Rao and Sivakumar’s (1999) ideas.
Holland (2006: 82) also stresses the importance
of market feedback in his model of corporate and
market interaction. Non-observable stock market
outcomes can be inferred from an active dialogue
with market participants (Holland 2006: 118).
2.5 Company- and market-side change drivers
The two-dimensional model outlined in Figure 1
is a necessarily simplified attempt to encapsulate
previous research contributions about the context
of investor relations. The linking arrows between
the boxes can represent different functional forms
of relationships. There might be a monotonic rela-
tionship between more disclosure (Box 3) and 
analyst following (Box 4) whereas other relation-
ships could be more complex and less amenable to
being expressed mathematically. The relationships
are influenced over time by change drivers (Boxes
1 and 5). The investor relations function in Box 2
26 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
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mediates the relationship between company-side
change drivers (Box 1) and disclosure actions. In
respect of market-side change drivers the arrow
along the top of Figure 1 shows how feedback may
occur directly. For example new regulation will
cause the company to change disclosure and a new
disclosure position will become established. By a
less direct route globalisation will lead to market
outcomes (Box 4) and the company will learn and
adapt (Box 6). The arrows in Figure 1 illustrate
only the main expected linkages to avoid compli-
cation.
The literature has provided evidence that in-
vestor relations activity has changed over time
with the establishment of investor relations depart-
ments (Rao and Sivakumar, 1999) and greater use
of conference calls (Tasker, 1998 and Bushee et al.,
2003). I expect that environmental factors (market-
side change drivers, Box 5b) have contributed to
changes in the investor relations industry.
Globalisation has increased competition in the
world’s capital markets and companies wishing to
market their capital internationally perceive the
need to professionalise and enhance their investor
relations efforts. (See, for example, Gray (2000)
who discussed the need for US companies to 
market their stocks to European investors and
Holland’s (2004: 68) discussion of the internation-
alisation of the market for information.) Stulz
(1999: 24) noted that globalisation of capital mar-
kets increases the monitoring of management and
hence increases firm value. This extra monitoring
increases the work of the investor relations depart-
ment. Yoshikawa and Gedajlovic (2002) examined
whether greater exposure to global capital markets
had any impact on Japanese firms’ investor rela-
tions practices and found that foreign ownership
and foreign listings were positively associated
with investor relations.
For UK listed companies institutional ownership
of shares declined from 60.1% to 49.4% over the
period 1991 to 2002 but there was an increase in
foreign (‘rest of the world’) ownership of ordinary
shares from 12.8% to 32.1%. Individual ownership
dropped from 19.9% to 14.3% (National Statistics,
2003: 9 Table A). This increase in foreign owner-
ship over the period studied in this paper places 
increased demands on UK investor relations de-
partments. Difficult UK stock market conditions,
with a bear market in 2001 to 2003, will have stim-
ulated some companies into trying harder with
their investor relations efforts whereas other com-
panies will have made a strategic decision not to
invest more effort in investor relations until condi-
tions improved.
Increased amounts of rules and regulations will
have enabled investor relations departments to
argue for greater resources to deal effectively with
the additional requirements. Changes in the regu-
latory environment will have caused companies’
investor relations departments to adopt new prac-
tices, such as more extensive recording of private
disclosures (see results section later) or live web
casting of results presentations.
At the individual company level there are many
potential change drivers. The general environmen-
tal factors mentioned above will have affected
some companies more than others (Bushee and
Miller, 2005: 18). For example, during the dot.com
boom ‘old economy’ companies may have decided
to invest more in investor relations if they felt the
market was undervaluing their stocks during the
bubble period (see Holland 2006: 112–114).
Additionally, variables identified in Table 1 will
have influenced some companies’ investor rela-
tions efforts more than others’. Company man-
agers are also change drivers because they are
responsible for disclosure strategy, and for any
changes in investor relations, as discussed by Lev
(1992) and Gibbins et al. (1990).
The availability of company data at two points in
time enables the effect of change drivers on in-
vestor relations activity levels and perceptions
about investor relations to be assessed in this
paper. However it is outside the scope of this proj-
ect to measure change drivers or to establish sta-
tistical relationships between measures of change
drivers and company investor relations data.
2.6. Motivation for exploring the two-dimensional
model
Bushee and Miller (2005) noted the widespread
use of investor relations and the large costs in-
curred. They also commented that little academic
research has focused on the investor relations
process and stated that there was a paucity of dis-
cussion of the complete investor relations process
in the literature. Notwithstanding their comment,
in the UK qualitative research on investor relations
meetings had been carried out by Holland (1997,
1998), Marston (1999) and Roberts et al. (2006).
This paper provides a new contribution by de-
scribing and analysing investor relations meetings
in the context of the whole investor relations
process. It updates prior work in the UK and draws
on theoretical understandings that have been de-
veloped by a number of authors in recent years.
The quantitative models discussed in the litera-
ture review are not sophisticated in terms of delin-
eating the details of the relationships between
variables. Most of the literature explaining in-
vestor relations (Figure 1, Box 3) suggests that
something (e.g. adoption of an investor relations
department) will happen if certain factors are in
place or that there will be a positive or negative as-
sociation between certain variables and investor
relations variables. It is also possible that extreme
values (high and/or low) of a variable may be as-
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sociated with an effect on an investor relations
variable (giving a U-shaped or step function rela-
tionship rather than a montonic one (Gelb 2000:
181). There are also some findings showing that
company variables are associated with changes in
investor relations disclosure scores (Lang and
Lundholm, 1993: 266). The papers reviewed in
Tables 1 and 2 contain some results inconsistent
with theory and differing results according to
model specification. The qualitative approaches
taken by Holland (2004) and Roberts et al. (2006)
attempt to deal with complexities involved in
human interaction. A perfect theory that can ex-
plain and predict exactly how individual compa-
nies implement investor relations, what they
communicate, the level of investor relations activ-
ity and how changes will occur over time in re-
sponse to change drivers is not likely to be
achieved because of the complexities outlined in
Figure 1. This study aims to offer an improved in-
sight informed both by the positive theory ap-
proach, empirical results arising from hypothesis
testing and the qualitative research agenda.
Accordingly, the study presents data about the in-
vestor relations process, activity levels and per-
ceptions of investor relations, explains this data in
the context of the two-dimensional model and
models the investor relations activity levels using
a regression model.
3. The research questions and hypotheses
Having constructed the two-dimensional model in
Figure 1, the main research questions are: how is
the investor relations function carried out, how
much investor relations is carried out, how can dif-
ferences between companies be explained, what
are the perceptions of management about what is
going on and how has the situation changed over
time in response to change drivers? In more detail
I state the questions as follows:
• RQ1 How does the company investor relations
function operate in communicating with analysts
and investors (Boxes 2 and 6) and what is the
perceived relative importance of the various
methods both now (Box 1a) and in the past (Box
1b)?
• RQ2 What is the company management’s per-
ception of its relationship with analysts and in-
vestors (Box 1a) and in the past (Box 1b and
Box 5) and what is the company management’s
perception of the benefits of investor relations
meetings and the effect of investor relations
overall (Boxes 1 and 4)?
‘Market outcomes’ (Box 4) have been researched
empirically as documented in the literature review.
For the purposes of this study company respon-
dents’ perceptions of market outcomes were ob-
tained in order to answer the research question.
• RQ3 What topics are discussed at investor rela-
tions meetings (Boxes 3 and 5) and what is the
perceived relative importance of the various top-
ics discussed both now (Box 1a) and in the past
(Box 1b)?
In respect of the research questions relating to
perceptions I expect from the literature review that
respondents from larger companies will tend to
view investor relations and its elements as being
more important than respondents from smaller
companies. Six out of seven of the empirical pa-
pers summarised in Table 1 found that size was a
significant explanatory variable for the dependent
investor relations variable in a multivariate regres-
sion model. This leads to the following question:
• RQ4 Is there an association between company
size and respondents’ perceptions about the im-
portance and value of investor relations?1
The final question is a key question in this paper
because it deals not with respondents’ rating scale
perceptions or yes/no variables but with numerical
measures of investor relations that can only be ob-
tained from company insiders. Prior explanatory
research as detailed in Table 1 (apart from
Marston, 1993) uses externally observed dichoto-
mous measures or continuous measures of percep-
tions from the US Financial Analysts’ Federation
(FAF).
• RQ5 What is the level of investor relations 
activity of the company, has it changed over 
time and what determines the current level of 
activity?
Investor relations activity is defined as a latent
variable representing the amount of organisational
effort or resources devoted to investor relations.
There are many proxies that can be used to meas-
ure investor relations activity. I use the number of
one-to-one investor relations meetings held by the
company and the size of the potential and actual
audience attending any type of investor relations
meeting (Box 2).
The empirical literature attempting to explain in-
vestor relations activity (Table 1) provided an in-
centive for testing a regression model of the level
of investor relations activity (RQ5) as measured by
the number of investor relations meetings and the
size of the audience. The results demonstrated a
wide variation between companies in respect of
the number of investor relations meetings held and
the size of the audience. (Descriptive statistics are
Vol. 38 No. 1. 2008 29
1 I acknowledge that other company specific variables are
also likely to affect perceptions of company respondents.
However given that perceptions are evaluated on a ranking
scale which is ordinal in nature it is not proposed to attempt
further analysis of the reasons for different responses.
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shown later in Tables 9 and 10). Bearing in mind
the theories and findings presented in the literature
review, there were several potential variables that
might explain the observed variations in the data
and help to answer the research question. These
will now be discussed.
3.1. Ownership structure and dispersion
Ownership structure and dispersion of share-
holdings can be measured in a number of ways. In
this study I take three measures as proxies.
Dealing first with geographical dispersion, I ex-
pect that companies with foreign listings are likely
to hold more one-to-one meetings, possibly as part
of a roadshow, in order to meet the needs of for-
eign investors. Previous research has shown that
firms with international listings tend to disclose
more information, both in their annual reports and
by other means, than firms with a domestic listing
only (Ahmed and Courtis, 1999). It seems likely
that international listing will cause firms to put
more effort into their investor relations function.
As the US is generally held to be the world’s lead-
ing capital market with the most strict regulations
it is possible that a US listing will have more effect
on disclosure than a listing elsewhere. Foreign list-
ings are likely to stimulate demand for meetings
from analysts and fund managers based in those
markets. Marston (1993: 234) found that a foreign
listing status was significantly positively associat-
ed with the number of one-to-one meetings. The
hypothesis is:
H1 A company’s listing status (foreign rather
than domestic only) is positively associated with
the level of investor relations activity.
In respect of dispersion among shareholders I ex-
pect that the total number of shareholders will not
affect the number of one-to-one meetings as these
are reserved for analysts and investing institutions.
However the level of free-float, the percentage of
shares available to be traded on the market, may
have an effect on a company’s incentive to hold
one-to-one meetings. Also, if a large proportion of
the equity is in permanent ownership (possibly by
the founding family) and not available for trading
on the stock exchange there may be little point in
devoting extensive efforts to investor relations.
Thus there may be fewer one-to-one meetings and
fewer participants in such meetings when a compa-
ny has a low free-float, and a high proportion of
shares held by the board, family and associates.
Marston (1993: 234–235) found the percentage of
insider shareholdings was significantly negatively
related to the number of one-to-one meetings for
univariate tests but not for multivariate analysis.
Gelb (2000: 170) argued that managerial ownership
mitigates agency costs and therefore reduces the
need for costly accounting disclosures. He found
that lower levels of managerial ownership were as-
sociated with more highly rated disclosure in annu-
al and quarterly reports. However he did find that
investor relations disclosures were not influenced
by the level of managerial ownership.
H2 The level of free-float is positively associat-
ed with the level of investor relations activity.
H3 The level of insider holdings is negatively 
associated with the level of investor relations 
activity.
3.2. Institutional ownership
Bushee et al. (2003) have argued and shown that
the percentage of institutional ownership is nega-
tively associated with real time open access to con-
ference calls as opposed to closed conference
calls. Accordingly I expect that a high level of in-
stitutional ownership will be associated with a
greater number of one-to-one meetings. Buy-side
analysts and fund managers request one-to-one
meetings as valuable discussions can take place in
these relatively private events. Companies offer
one-to-one meetings in order to attract and retain
institutional investors. Both the percentage held by
the institutions and the number of institutions in-
volved are likely to drive the number of one-to-one
meetings. A company with a high percentage held
by a small number of institutions is likely to expe-
rience a different demand for meetings than a com-
pany with a high percentage held by a large
number of institutions. Therefore I use two proxies
in the model (Bushee and Miller, 2005: 19).
H4 The level of institutional ownership is posi-
tively associated with the level of investor rela-
tions activity.
H5 The number of institutional owners is posi-
tively associated with the level of investor rela-
tions activity.
3.3. Analyst following
The number of sell-side analysts following a firm
is likely to be associated with an increased number
of one-to-one meetings. Tasker (1998) has shown
that higher analyst following is associated with
holding conference calls and Rao and Sivakumar
(1999) have shown that firms with higher analyst
following were more likely to establish an investor
relations department. Bushee et al. (2003) argued
and found that analyst following would be nega-
tively related to holding open access rather than
closed conference calls. Sell-side analysts are like-
ly to request one-to-one meetings in order to enable
them to (hopefully) produce superior research re-
ports and make better recommendations.
H6 The level of analyst following is positively
associated with the level of investor relations 
activity.
30 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
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3.4. Complex information disclosure environment
Bushee et al. (2003) hypothesised that firms
with complex information disclosures would be
more likely to hold closed conference calls as op-
posed to open access calls. Tasker (1998) hypoth-
esised that firms with less informative financial
statements (proxied by industry market to book
values) would tend to hold conference calls.
Frankel et al. (1999) hypothesised that firms which
were difficult to analyse (for example those with
intangible assets or in a high tech industry) would
be likely to hold conference calls. Following this
line of reasoning I hypothesise that firms with
complex disclosures will hold more one-to-one
meetings to make those disclosures or explain
them in more detail. A complex information dis-
closure environment is a latent variable that can be
proxied in various ways.
Market to book value (MTBV) is a variable that
could possibly indicate the need for complex dis-
closures via a company’s investor relations. If a
company has a high market value compared to the
assets shown in the accounts this could indicate the
presence of intangible assets which do not appear
on the balance sheet, such as intellectual capital.
MTBV has frequently been used to proxy for a
company’s growth options in the literature. As
countries move from a manufacturing based econo-
my to a services based economy it is often argued
that traditional balance sheets need to be supple-
mented by information about intangible income
generating assets (Beattie and Thomson, 2004). In
order to achieve this, companies with a high MTBV
may put more effort into investor relations. They
may offer more one-to-one meetings and attract a
larger audience for these meetings. On the other
hand, a low MTBV could be due to a ‘low’ share
price following bad news or negative market senti-
ment or a negative book value and this might cause
companies to offer more meetings to explain the sit-
uation. Analysts who are looking for recovery
stocks might be interested in attending meetings
with low MTBV companies and fund managers
with an investment in such companies could also be
keen to find out what it going on (Marston 2004:
62). Thus the relationship may not be monotonic.
In view of the debates surrounding accounting
for intangible assets I also expect that companies
with recorded intangible assets on their balance
sheets may need to hold more one-to-one meetings
to tell their value-creation story. Additionally some
industries are inherently more complex than others
and in particular high tech industries (such as
biotech firms) may feel the need to hold more one-
to-one meetings.
Accordingly I select three measures to proxy a
complex information disclosure environment.2
H7 The market to book value ratio is associated
with the level of investor relations activity OR 
H7a A high market to book value is positively 
associated with the level of investor relations 
activity
H7b A low market to book value is positively as-
sociated with the level of investor relations ac-
tivity
H8 The existence of intangible assets in the bal-
ance sheet is positively associated with the level
of investor relations activity
H9 Membership of a high tech industry is posi-
tively associated with the level of investor rela-
tions activity
3.5. Raising of capital
Lang and Lundholm (1993), Tasker (1998) and
Gelb (2000) found the raising of capital to be sig-
nificant in their models. Frankel et al. (1999)
found a positive association with issuance of debt
and not equity. I hypothesise that companies issu-
ing new capital will be likely to hold more one-to-
one meetings as they will need to maintain the
interest and confidence of analysts and institutions
to ensure that their issues are successful. Analysts
and fund managers may be more likely to request
meetings to discuss such activities.
H10 The raising of new capital is positively 
associated with the level of investor relations 
activity
3.6. Control variable: company size
Company size has been shown by many studies
to be associated with increased disclosure (Ahmed
and Courtis, 1999). The papers summarised in
Table 1 indicate that it is also an important deter-
minant of investor relations actions and disclosure
levels (although Bushee et al. (2003) was an ex-
ception). Large companies have more capital to
market, they have more resources available and
they are under great pressure to increase trans-
parency. It seems likely that they will devote more
effort to investor relations than smaller companies.
Thus they might hold more one-to-one meetings.
From the point of view of the analysts and fund
managers, larger companies will naturally attract
their attention unless they are required to spe-
cialise in smaller companies by their employers.
Size may also indicate the presence of a complex
disclosure environment as larger companies tend
to be more complex in structure, segmentation and
the type of activities they undertake.
H11 A company’s size is positively associated
with the level of investor relations activity.
Vol. 38 No. 1. 2008 31
2 Bushee et al. (2003) used five proxies for complex infor-
mation disclosures and Tasker (1998) used four industry meas-
ures of financial statement informativeness.
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ita
s D
ian
 N
us
wa
nto
ro
], 
[R
iri
h D
ian
 Pr
ati
wi
 SE
 M
si]
 at
 21
:02
 29
 Se
pte
mb
er 
20
13
 
3.7. The regression model for RQ5
The model developed in the hypotheses section
above can be expressed as follows: (Investor 
relations activity level) = a0 + a1(Ownership 
dispersion/structure: listing status FLIST) +
a2(Ownership dispersion/structure: free float 
F-F%) + a3(Ownership dispersion/structure: insid-
er holdings BFA% ) + a4(Institutional ownership:
percentage INST% ) + a5(Institutional ownership:
number of institutional owners INSTNO) +
a6(Analyst following ANALYST) + a7(Complex
disclosure environment: market to book value
MTBV) + a8(Complex disclosure environment: 
intangible assets on balance sheet IA/TOTA) +
a8(Complex disclosure environment: high tech in-
dustry HIGHTECH) + a9(Recent raising of new
capital NEWCAP)+ a10(Company size MKTCAP)
+ ε
The latent dependent variable ‘investor relations
activity’ is proxied by the number of one-to-one
meetings (1-1s) and by six measures of the size of
the audience for all types of investor relations
meetings from the sell-side (SSA-ATT, SSA-LIST,
SB-FIRMS) and the buy-side (BSA-ATT, BSA-
LIST, II-FIRMS). Thus seven regressions using
different proxies are carried out. Definitions of the
dependent and independent variables are shown in
Table 10.
4. Research method
To answer the research questions, information was
needed from company managers. A postal ques-
tionnaire was sent to the top 500 UK companies in
two stages. The first stage was a survey of the top
500 European companies (Marston, 2004) and this
population included 143 UK companies of which
61 responded. The second stage was a survey of
the top 500 UK companies but as the top 143 com-
panies had already been surveyed in stage one the
earlier results were retained.
The first stage mailing was sent to the top 500
European companies measured by market capital-
isation on 4 January 2001 and, as noted above, 143
of these were British companies. The list was ob-
tained from the Financial Times FT500 (Financial
Times, 2001). Questionnaires were posted out in
batches over a three-week period commencing on
17 January 2002. The questionnaire was addressed
to the Finance Director by name where this infor-
mation was available. In other cases it was ad-
dressed to the Finance Director. Follow-up letters
and questionnaires were sent out to non-respon-
dents in March 2002. The follow-up letters were
addressed to the investor relations officer. The sec-
ond stage mailing was sent to the rest of the top
500 British companies (Financial Times, 2001)
and these questionnaires were sent out in
November 2002, with follow-up letters and ques-
tionnaires in January/February 2003. Price move-
ments in the UK stock market in the year prior to
the survey and during the survey period exhibited
a general downward trend3 that may have had
some effect on company respondents.
4.1. The questionnaire
The questionnaire contained eight sections cov-
ering various aspects of the investor relations
process. The questionnaire design was based on
Marston (1993) but was improved in order to re-
move ambiguities that had been noted during cod-
ing responses to the earlier project. A review of
recent academic and professional publications was
carried out to update the questionnaire. Further im-
provements were made at the pilot stage with the
assistance of investor relations practitioners. The
new questionnaire contained many similar ques-
tions enabling some comparisons and assessment
of changes to be made over time. Additional ques-
tions related to changes in the environment (such
as the Internet) in order that an updated description
could be obtained and that the impact of change
drivers on the investor relations activity could be
measured.
4.2. Response rate
Out of the 500 UK companies in the FT Top 500
for 2001, 39 had de-listed, merged, or been taken
over by the time the questionnaires were posted,
giving an effective total of 461 companies eligible
to respond, of which 143 replied, giving a response
rate of 31%. 55% of respondents were specialist
investor relations personnel although 42% of re-
sponses were from finance directors. As shown in
Table 3, the responses from finance directors tend-
ed to be from the smaller companies.
Respondents were larger than non-respondents.4
There was no statistically significant difference
between the response rates from different industri-
al sectors.
5. Results
I now set out and discuss the results of the research
questions obtained from the questionnaire re-
sponses. The discussion contains interpretations
drawn from the literature review especially those
relating to theory.
As discussed above, I expect some changes in
investor relations to have occurred over time as a
result of company-side change drivers and market-
side change drivers (Figure 1). In order to investi-
32 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
3 The FTSE100 index fell from 6,222 to 4,129 and the FTSE
All Share index from 2,983 to 2,006 between January 2001
and July 2003.
4 A t-test showed no significant difference (t, df 459 = 1.32,
significance 0.5) but in view of the distributional properties of
the size variable a non-parametric test was also carried out. A
Mann-Whitney test (two-tailed) comparing respondents with
non-respondents was significant (Z –4.244, significance .000).
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Table 3
Details of respondents and response rates
Market Capitalisation
Mean Median SD N
£m £m
Job title of respondents
Finance Director 1,0401 345 1,566 59
Investor Relations Director 9,355 3,898 18,627 59
Investor Relations Officer 4,050 815 7,512 19
Other 1,425 1,620 1,066 6
Completed questionnaire 4,887 1,046 12,843 143
Refused or no answer 3,160 484 13,044 318
Population 3,696 556 12,933 461
1 A Kruskal-Wallis test confirmed that responses from finance directors were from significantly smaller com-
panies (significance level .000).
gate this, the results of the survey in 2002 are com-
pared with results of an earlier survey carried out
in 1991 (Marston, 1993). The population in 1991
consisted of the top 547 UK companies by market
capitalisation at the time.5
The 1991 survey was the first academic postal
questionnaire survey of investor relations carried
out in the UK and this possibly explains the high
response rate of 62%. The lower response rate for
the recent survey in 2002 is likely due to survey fa-
tigue being experienced by company finance di-
rectors and investor relations officers.6
5.1 Research question 1
Respondents were asked to rank the importance
of a variety of communication channels that are
typically used by investor relations departments.
The results in Table 4 show that one-to-one meet-
ings were ranked most highly with answering tele-
phone queries second and general or group
meetings third. This agrees with the rankings ob-
tained by Marston in 1991 (Marston, 1996: 23).
Additionally the median scores7 were the same in
2002 and 1991 for the five items for which com-
parative data was available. The importance of pri-
vate communication has also been emphasised by
Holland (1997 and 1998) and Beattie (1999). Thus
it is not surprising that the rankings remain the
same given that one-to-one meetings and answer-
ing telephone queries are more private than gener-
al meetings. Market-side change drivers such as
increased regulation and scrutiny of company dis-
closures have not affected the perceptions reported
in Table 4. Seven new activities were added to the
survey in 2002 and these reflected the increasing
use of information technology (e-mail and
Internet) and included other methods that had been
noted as being of importance when performing the
literature review (e.g. site visits, roadshows).
However the use of e-mail and the website had not
supplanted the traditional communication chan-
nels. Although the use of conference calls has been
studied in a US context by Tasker (1998) and
Bushee et al. (2003) their perceived importance is
relatively low in the UK.
Companies were asked whether they kept
records of their investor relations meetings.
Records were kept by the majority of the respon-
dents for both general (79%) and one-to-one meet-
ings (77%). In the survey in 1991 the level of
record keeping for general (57%) and one-to-one
meetings (49%) was lower.
The theoretical framework provides an explana-
tion for this increase in recording. Firstly it is
caused by increased regulation since 1991 (a mar-
ket-side change driver) leading to a high level of
awareness of the need to control and monitor pri-
vate disclosures (see Marston, 1996: 5–19). Also
globalisation pressures have contributed to greater
investor relations professionalism. Recording
meetings helps company staff to be well prepared
for return visits from investors (Marston 2004:
58). This fits in with Healy and Palepu’s (2001)
management talent signalling hypothesis. Beattie
(1999) has suggested that minutes of one-to-one
5 There were 337 respondents in total giving a response rate
of 62%. Of these, 325 respondents identified themselves and a
Z test comparing the respondents (by size) with the population
was not significant. However size was not distributed normal-
ly and repeating the test using the log of the size showed a sig-
nificant result (significance p=0.032) indicating that
respondents were larger on average than the population.
6 In comparing the results of the two surveys it is worth not-
ing that 307 of the companies from the 1991 population were
in the 2002 population and that 46 companies responded to
both surveys.
7 Not shown in Table 4.
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34 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
Table 4
Importance of communication channels with analysts and investors
Percentage of respondents
Not at all Minor Moderate High Mean1,2 Rank Rank 
– not done (median) 2002 19913
One-to-one meetings 0 0 6 94 3.94 1 1
(4)^
Answering telephone queries 0 6 25 69 3.62 2 2
(4)
**
General meetings, i.e. 4 6 37 53 3.41 3 3
meetings for delegates from (4) 
different organisations *
Providing feedback on 1 12 39 48 3.34 4 4
analysts’ reports (3)
Roadshows 7 14 33 46 3.18 5 N/A
(3)
**
Answering e-mail queries 4 20 32 44 3.17 6 N/A
(3)
**
Via Investor Relations section 4 17 40 39 3.15 7 N/A
on website (3)
**
E-mailing information to those 9 14 47 30 2.97 8 N/A
on a circulation list (3)
*
Site visits 9 21 37 33 2.95 9 N/A
(3)
*
Conference calls 12 21 34 33 2.87 10 N/A
(3)
**
Mailing information 7 35 40 18 2.70 11 5
(3)^
Web casts 33 21 26 20 2.32 12 N/A
(2)
**
1 Where: 4 = High importance; 3 = Moderate importance; 2 = Minor importance; 1 = Not at all – not done; N/A
not applicable to 1991 survey.
2 The relationship between ranking scale answers and company size is positive in all cases and significant 
at the following levels in a Kruskal-Wallis test: ** significant at the .01 level, * significant at the .05 level, 
^ significant at the .1 level
3 1991 figures are based on a maximum of 325 respondents to individual questions (subject to missing values).
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meetings should be placed in an electronic library.
This might ‘level the playing field’ for all investors
although Bodoff and Zhang (2003: 456) point out
that there is a vast literature in accounting, finance
and economics that shows the benefits of more, or
more widespread, disclosure are far from straight-
forward.
5.2. Research question 2
The questionnaire asked for opinions about 
relationships with analysts and fund managers
(Table 5). Given the amount of organisational ef-
fort and management time devoted to investor re-
lations it was considered important to establish
company respondents’ personal attitudes towards
investor relations.
Company respondents generally considered in-
vestor relations meetings and telephone calls to be
a valuable means of communication. This finding
of a positive attitude towards investor relations
meetings agrees with Roberts et al. (2006: 282)
who found that meetings were ‘grasped as an op-
portunity’ to influence investor decision making.
The company respondents did not appear to con-
sider themselves pressurised to reveal inside infor-
mation. There has been an increasing pressure on
UK companies to be very careful about selectively
revealing price-sensitive inside information
(Marston 1999: 4). However the responses indicat-
ed that they can manage these pressures comfort-
ably.
There has been an ongoing debate in the UK re-
garding the alleged short-termist attitude of the
City of London (Marsh, 1990). For this reason per-
ceptions about short-termism were sought from
company respondents. On average the respondents
did feel that sell-side analysts were somewhat
more short-termist than the buy-side.
The mean score for the responses to these ques-
tions were ranked in the same order as the re-
sponses to similar questions in the 1991 survey.
Additionally the median scores were the same for
seven out of eight of the items8 for which compar-
ative data was available. This is interesting in that
the results show consistent respondent perceptions
over a time-period in which several change drivers
have been operating. For example, as noted previ-
ously, company disclosure has been subjected to
closer scrutiny and regulation but this has not af-
fected the popularity of one-to-one meetings.
Respondents were asked for opinions about 
investor relations meetings. Most respondents
strongly agreed that meetings are important for
demonstrating the quality of the management team
(Table 5). It was also generally agreed that presen-
tation skills are important and that management
can receive valuable feedback at meetings. These
findings agree with the results of an interview
based study in the UK by Marston (1999).
Additionally Beattie (1999: xi) found that quality
of management was the most highly ranked driver
of company performance in a survey of informa-
tion users. This finding can be related to Healy and
Palepu’s (2001) management talent signalling hy-
pothesis and shows that management wished to
demonstrate their quality to the market. One note
of caution comes from Roberts et al. (2006: 286),
who note that ‘face-to-face meetings ensure that
the qualities of the message and the messengers
become inextricably and consequentially en-
twined’ and ‘there is no metric that reliably relates
the body language of an executive to future finan-
cial performance’. Given the vast amount of pub-
lished information available from companies it
appears that assessment of management quality is
a key reason for attending meetings. It would be
difficult to report formally on management quality
because intangibles like body language, personali-
ty and the interaction between members of the
management team cannot easily be put into words.
To establish the perceived effect of investor rela-
tions on the market for the company’s securities,
respondents were asked whether they agreed with
five general statements about the benefits/effects
of the investor relations programme. In general
there was agreement that it helps to ensure securi-
ties are fairly priced and improves market liquidi-
ty. This is in agreement with the findings of Bushee
and Miller (2005). While Bushee et al. (2003)
found that higher price volatility occurred during
the period of conference calls, the respondents
generally agreed that investor relations helped to
reduce share price volatility. Respondents were
generally uncertain as to whether investor relations
reduced the cost of capital.
5.3 Research question 3
In order to establish what was actually discussed
at meetings, respondents were presented with a
long list of possible topics. This was based on a
previous study (Marston, 1993) with an additional
section (designated ‘management issues’) de-
signed to take account of recent trends in company
reporting and the business environment.
The following three tables summarise respon-
dents’ views on the importance of the provision of
information on past performance (Table 6), future
prospects (Table 7), and management issues (Table
8) at investor relations meetings. Topics are listed
in rank order of perceived importance. Tables 6
and 7 provide comparative data in order to assess
any effect of change drivers.
An explanation of recent results was considered
most important of the listed items on past per-
formance. The relative importance of the listed
items was found to be exactly the same as in the
Vol. 38 No. 1. 2008 35
8 Not shown in Table 5.
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36 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
Table 5
Perceptions about IR
Mean score1 2002 1991 
(median)2 N rank rank
Relationship with sell-side analysts
Company meetings with sell-side analysts are a 4.35 (4) 139 1 1
valuable means of communication
Company telephone conversations with sell-side 4.19 (4)^ 138 2 2 
analysts are a valuable means of communication
Sell-side analysts are important in influencing 4.07 (4) 138 3 N/A
market views about my company
Sell-side analysts are too concerned with the 3.19 (3) 136 4 3/44
short-term rather than the long-term prospects 
for the company
Sell-side analysts pressurise my company for 2.49 (2) 138 5 5
inside information
Relationship with buy-side analysts and fund 
managers/institutional investors
Company meetings with buy-side analysts and 4.70 (5)* 141 1 1
fund managers/institutional investors are a 
valuable means of communication
Company telephone conversations with buy-side 4.27 (4)** 142 2 2
analysts and fund managers/institutional investors 
are a valuable means of communication
Buy-side analysts and fund managers/institutional 3.82 (4) 141 3 N/A
investors are important in influencing market views 
about my company
Buy-side analysts and fund managers/institutional 2.67 (2)** 138 4 3/422
investors are too concerned with the short-term 
rather than the long-term prospects for the company
Buy-side analysts and fund managers/institutional 2.09 (2) 141 5 5
investors pressurise my company for inside information
Opinions about investor relations meetings
Meetings are important for demonstrating the quality 4.60 (4)* 137
of the management team
Management may sometimes obtain valuable 4.23 (4) 138
information and feedback at meetings
Presentation skills are important to the success of 4.19 (4) 136
the meeting
Benefits and effects of IR programme
The benefits of investor relations exceed the costs 4.30 (4)** 142
Investor relations helps to ensure that the market 3.76 (4)** 139
price of securities is fair
Investor relations helps to improve liquidity in the 3.61 (4)** 142
market for the company’s securities
Investor relations helps to reduce share price volatility 3.45 (4)** 140
Investor relations reduces the cost of capital 3.33 (3) 141
1 Where: Strongly agree = 5; Agree = 4; Neutral = 3; Disagree = 2; Strongly disagree = 1.
2 The relationship between ranking scale answers and company size is significant at the following levels in 
a two-tailed Kruskal-Wallis test: ** significant at the .01 level, * significant at the .05 level, ^ significant at 
the .1 level.
3 1991 figures are based on a maximum of 325 respondents to individual questions (subject to missing values).
4 The questions about the short-term were subdivided into 2 questions in the 1991 survey.
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1991 survey. The theoretical framework provides
no prediction for ranking the topics nor any spe-
cific prediction that the mean rankings might
change over time. Although the existence of
change drivers had the potential to influence the
results, this did not occur. The empirical studies
identified in the literature review (see Table 1) in-
dicated that good performance (measured in vari-
ous ways) is linked with investor relations
disclosure and the findings here confirmed the per-
ceived importance of discussing past performance.
Respondents also had space to make additional
entries about past performance, with their per-
ceived importance. These varied widely and corre-
sponded with items in the theoretical models
predicting investor relations disclosures. They in-
cluded: cash generated per segment, an exception-
al event and cash conversion actions (complex
information disclosures, Bushee et al., 2003), com-
petitive positioning (Tasker, 1998 and Gelb, 2000),
capital efficiency, capital expenditure and 10-year
performance against an index (Tasker, 1998).
Short-term strategy, major new products and de-
velopments and long-term strategy were the most
important topics relating to future prospects. These
types of disclosures could be considered to be
complex information disclosures following the
model of Bushee et al. (2003) and therefore per-
haps more suitable for discussion in a private
meeting. The rankings were quite similar to those
obtained in 1991 although an explanation of major
new projects and developments has risen in the
rankings. This indicates increased market-side
pressures for more specific forward-looking infor-
mation. The items listed in Table 7 are not mutual-
ly exclusive and some are more specific than oth-
ers. New information about many of the items
listed in Table 7 could be price-sensitive and there-
fore should not be issued initially at a private brief-
ing. However companies are able to discuss and
explain the items using public domain information
as the basis. An ‘explanation of profits forecast’ is
ranked as minor to moderate importance. There
are regulatory problems with issuing profits fore-
casts in the UK. However companies can discuss
the consensus forecasts produced by analysts or
discuss ‘ball park figures’ without committing to
an exact figure.
Respondents’ own entries about future prospects,
with their perceived importance varied widely.
They included current-year earnings guidance,
volume/price outlook, government spending,
growth agenda and organisational culture change.
The last two items listed could be considered to be
complex information disclosures in line with the
Bushee et al. (2003) model.
The items listed as ‘management issues’ (Table
8) were intended to encapsulate some of the key
concerns that have been emerging in recent years.
Discussions about ‘creation of shareholder value’
were viewed as most important here. This mirrors
the findings of Roberts et al. (2006) who have re-
marked on the importance of shareholder value in
their study of meetings with fund managers.
Although corporate governance has been a topi-
cal issue since the 1990s in the UK it appeared to
be of only moderate importance for discussion in
investor relations meetings. Individual compo-
Vol. 38 No. 1. 2008 37
Table 6
Relative importance of provision of different types of information on past performance at meetings
Mean 2002 1991 
Past performance score1,2 N rank rank
Explanation of recent results in the context of 3.66 138 1 1
the general economic environment
Explanation of structure of balance sheet and 3.21 134 2 2
gearing
Performance of recent acquisitions 3.19 110 3 3
Additional breakdown of published figures by 3.02^ 127 4 4
line of business
Explanation of accounting policies 2.72 138 5 4
Additional breakdown of published figures by 2.55* 122 6 6
geographical area
Outcome of completed research and development 2.41 94 7 7
projects
1 Where: Not at all = 1, Minor importance = 2, Moderate importance = 3, High importance = 4 (Respondents
who considered the listed items ‘not applicable’ have been omitted.)
2 The relationship between ranking scale answers and company size is positive and significant at the follow-
ing levels in a Kruskal-Wallis test: * significant at the .05 level, ^ significant at the .1 level.
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nents of corporate governance that were listed (di-
rectors’ remuneration, external audit and internal
audit) were rated as less important than ‘corporate
governance generally’. This is because some in-
vesting institutions carry out their checks on cor-
porate governance using different personnel (i.e.
not the buy-side analysts and fund managers but
compliance checking officers of some sort). It is
also because UK companies are required to ‘com-
ply or explain’ adherence to corporate governance
codes. As a result of this regime, once the baseline
of corporate governance has been established,
there may be little need to discuss governance fur-
ther at meetings.
Risk management was ranked third after ‘corpo-
rate governance generally’. The issue of risk man-
agement and risk reporting had been the subject of
some scrutiny by the Institute of Chartered
Accountants in England and Wales (ICAEW, 1999)
prior to the survey. From the point of view of the
respondents it did not appear to be a very important
item for discussion at investor relations meetings.
Even less importance was attached to the provi-
sion of information on social and environmental
issues. Companies may provide social and envi-
ronmental information and even prepare a separate
report but find that there is very little discussion of
these matters in meetings with analysts and in-
vestors. The subordination of these topics to that of
shareholder value creation is not entirely surpris-
ing despite the vast amount of effort, discussion
and research devoted to social and environmental
reporting over the years.
Perhaps, surprisingly, provision of information
on intellectual capital was rated as even less im-
portant. Bushee et al. (2003) indicated that a com-
plex disclosure environment, including the
existence of intangibles, provides an incentive for
private disclosures. However it is possible that re-
spondents would have responded differently if the
question had referred to intangible assets in more
general terms.
5.4. Research question 4
In respect of the ranking scale answers, statisti-
cal tests were carried out comparing respondents’
38 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
Table 7
Relative importance of provision of different types of information on future prospects at meetings
Future prospects Mean 2002 1991
(subject, if necessary, to prior public announcement) score1,2 N rank rank
Company strategy in the short term (1–2 years) 3.72* 138 1 2
Explanation of major new projects and developments 3.60^ 134 2 6/9
Company strategy in the long term (>2 years) 3.55** 139 3 1
Company strategy for particular segments of the 3.47** 126 4 2
business
Cash flow situation 3.41** 140 5 4
Dividend policy 3.09 129 6 5
Company strategy on future acquisitions 3.07* 128 7 6
Explanation of new products 3.05 117 8 14/15
Long-term investment plans 3.05** 129 9 8
Explanation of new contracts 2.82 120 10 15/15
Current state of order book 2.77 101 11 13
Explanation of profits forecast 2.72 102 12 10/12
Company strategy on future disposals 2.70 114 13 10
Explanation of new research and development 2.47 91 14 19/20
projects
Prospects of current research and development 2.43 90 15 18
projects
1 Where: Not at all = 1, Minor importance = 2, Moderate importance = 3, High importance = 4.
In the 1991 survey there were 20 listed items and five of the items in the 2002 survey were subdivided into 
two items in 1991. For example ‘Explanation of new products’ was divided into ‘First announcement of new
products’ and ‘Further explanation of new products that have already been announced’.
2 The relationship between ranking scale answers and company size is positive and significant at the following
levels in a Kruskal-Wallis test: ** significant at the .01 level, * significant at the .05 level, ^ significant at the
.1 level.
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answers with company size measured as market
value. The results of the tests are displayed in
Tables 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8. Table 4 shows that respon-
dents from larger companies were significantly
more likely to rank the importance of 11 out of 12
of the investor relations communications channels
more highly than the smaller respondents. The re-
sults are less clear-cut in the case of perceptions of
the company relationship with analysts and opin-
ions about investor relations meetings (Table 5)
with only five out of 13 significant results.
However it is noticeable that larger companies are
significantly more in favour of telephone calls and
meetings with the buy-side than are the smaller
companies. Larger companies were significantly
more likely to agree with the four out of five state-
ments about the benefits/effects of investor rela-
tions. In respect of Table 6, larger companies were
significantly more likely to consider provision of
additional segmental information as more impor-
tant than were smaller companies but there were
no significant differences for the other five items
listed. In respect of provision of information on fu-
ture prospects (Table 7), there were seven signifi-
cant results and eight items for which there was no
difference between the responses of smaller and
larger companies. It is notable that the seven sig-
nificant results were found within the nine items
ranked most important overall. Only two of the
nine items relating to management issues in 
Table 8 were significantly more important for larg-
er companies. Provision of information on the cre-
ation of shareholder value was ranked as more
important by larger companies indicating that they
are subjected to greater ‘disciplinary pressures’ by
investors (Roberts et al., 2006). As larger compa-
nies are subjected to higher political risk, this ex-
plains why they ranked social and environmental
information as more important than smaller com-
panies.
Larger companies were significantly more likely
to keep records of all types of meetings. They have
more resources to facilitate this and a greater in-
centive to avoid selective disclosure because of
their greater visibility and hence political risk.
Overall there is evidence to indicate that larger
companies saw investor relations as being more im-
portant than smaller companies, as was expected.
5.5 Research question 5
In order to establish the levels of investor rela-
tions activity in the respondent companies the
questionnaire asked for details of the number of in-
vestor relations meetings of all types held in the
past 12 months. Table 9 shows the mean number of
one-to-one meetings was 77, indicating a substan-
tial investment of time and effort. These meetings
typically involve the chief executive and/or the
chief finance officer along with members of the in-
vestor relations team. There had been a large in-
crease in the number of meetings since the 1991
survey when respondents from the UK top 500
companies reported an average of 25 one-to-one
meetings. This increase has been caused by mar-
ket-side change drivers (Figure 1) as discussed in
the literature review. The global competition for
capital has led companies to offer more one-to-one
meetings than previously. This is supported by the
fact that 28% of respondents had a foreign listing
compared to 18% in the 1991 survey (Marston
1993: 180). The demand for one-to-one meetings
increased as a result of increased competition be-
tween analysts. Competitive pressures in the fi-
nancial services sector increased in the period
Vol. 38 No. 1. 2008 39
Table 8
Relative importance of provision of different types of information on management issues at meetings
Mean 2002
Management issues score1,2 N rank
Creation of shareholder value 3.39** 137 1
Corporate governance generally 2.64 135 2
Risk management 2.47 131 3
Social and environmental issues 2.40** 136 4
Intellectual capital 2.27 117 5
Directors’ remuneration 2.21 134 6
Succession plans for key management positions 2.17 132 7
External audit 2.02 131 8
Internal audit 1.91 126 9
1 Where: Not at all = 1, Minor importance = 2, Moderate importance = 3, High importance = 4.
2 The relationship between ranking scale answers and company size is positive and significant at the following
levels in a Kruskal-Wallis test: ** significant at the .01 level.
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40 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
Table 9
Investor relations activity levels: frequency of meetings and attendance levels
Domestic International Total Total
market 2002 2002 2002 1991
(based in your (based abroad)
own country)
Mean Mean Mean Mean
No. of meetings in past
12 months (12m)
One-to-one meetings
1-1s 76.8 24.7
General meetings 5.0 6.2
Site visits 3.8 N/A
Roadshows 4.8 N/A
Sell-side audience
SSA-ATT 28.5 8.3 32.7 24.0
SSA-LIST 37.6 15.8 47.1 26.5
SB-FIRMS 19.3 3.8 23.9 17.8
Buy-side audience
BSA-ATT 52.7 32.6 81.0 42.2
BSA-LIST 93.1 59.2 146.6 53.5
II-FIRMS 42.3 21.4 60.8 30.3
Note: The number of respondents to each requested item varied from 73 to 129.
SSA-ATT = no. of sell-side analysts attending meetings of all types in past 12m.
SSA-LIST = no. of sell-side analysts on invitation list
SB-FIRMS = no. of stock-broking firms sending representatives to meetings of all types in past 12m.
BSA-ATT = no. of buy-side analysts and fund managers/institutional investors attending meetings of all types
in past 12m.
BSA-LIST = no. of buy-side analysts and fund managers/institutional investors on invitation list.
II-FIRMS = no. of institutional investor firms sending representatives to meetings of all types in past 12m.
from the early 1990s (Johansson, 2007: 8) and the
performance of sell-side analysts came under in-
creased scrutiny (Koreto, 2001).
Other market-side change drivers were the clos-
er surveillance of companies for breaches of insid-
er dealing law and regulations and the
post-Cadbury era of corporate governance. In
1991 it was possible to grant one-to-one meetings
to favoured institutional investors and analysts
only (Marston, 1996: 24–26) whereas this was no
longer the case in 2002. Fund managers nowadays
request meetings more often as a result of the in-
creased importance of corporate governance issues
(Marston, 2004: 53). They are also required, in
some cases, to meet with companies under the
terms of the investment principles of the fund they
work for.9,10
The mean number of general meetings was five
and this was slightly lower than the 1991 survey.
General ‘set piece’ meetings follow the financial
calendar and relate mainly to results announce-
ments. They may also be organised in special situ-
ations such as takeovers and mergers. There were
no obvious market-side change drivers that would
have caused an increase in general meetings in the
period. The mean number of site visits was 3.8 and
the mean for roadshows was 4.8. Site visits in-
volve visits to company premises by invited ana-
lysts and/or fund managers. Road-shows involve a
team from a company visiting a financial centre
and holding group meetings and one-to-one meet-
ings with the aim of meeting analysts and investors
who might not visit the company at its own prem-
ises. This can be useful for meeting overseas ana-
lysts and investors.
Analyst following and institutional ownership
are both important to UK quoted companies.
Analysts write research reports and make forecasts
and offer buy, sell or hold recommendations.
9 As suggested by a pension fund trustee in conversation
with the author. See also Marston (2004: 53).
10 The data provided do not differentiate between meetings
for the sell-side and the buy-side so it is not clear how the in-
creased number of one-to-one meetings is divided. It was felt
that asking respondents to provide two numbers rather than
one would reduce the response rate to this particular question.
However the later data in Table 9 does provide a breakdown
between the buy-side and the sell-side audience.
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Companies want analysts to follow their shares as
this research helps to maintain interest among in-
vestors. In the UK the majority of shares are held
by institutions so companies need to attract and re-
tain institutional owners. Investor relations meet-
ings are used to maintain relationships with
analysts and existing and potential investors. The
size of the audience measures both the success of
the company’s investor relations programme and
the demand from the audience.
Respondents’ estimates of the number of ana-
lysts and investors who were invited to and who
attended meetings can be seen in Table 9. It also
provides details of the number of stock-broking
firms and the number of institutional investor or-
ganisations which were represented at meetings. In
view of the increasing globalisation of capital mar-
kets, respondents were asked to provide a split be-
tween the domestic market (analysts based in the
UK) and international market (analysts based
abroad). The ratio of domestic to international var-
ied from 1.6 to 5 for the various measures.
Table 9 shows that there were substantially more
institutional representatives on the invitation list
than there were sell-side analysts. However the
number of sell-side analysts had doubled since
1991 and the number of buy-side analysts had al-
most tripled. The numbers on the domestic invita-
tion lists exceeded the number on the international
list. The numbers actually attending meetings can
be seen to be smaller than the numbers on the in-
vitation lists. Another way of measuring atten-
dance at meetings is to look at the number of firms
sending representatives to a company’s investor
relations meetings. Table 9 also provides this in-
formation and it reflects the same pattern as the
other data.11
Overall the results in Table 9 show that compa-
nies were devoting substantial effort to holding
meetings for quite large numbers of analysts and
investors and that there has been an increased ef-
fort in the period 1991 to 2002. Market-side
change drivers, as discussed above and in the liter-
ature review, provide reasons for the increases ob-
served in the table.
In order to explain differences between compa-
nies, I use the regression model developed above. I
proxy the level of investor relations activity firstly
by the number of one-to-one meetings (1-1s) and
subsequently by the size of the actual and potential
audience for investor relations meetings (Table 9).
5.6. The variables
Descriptive statistics for the seven dependent
variables are provided in Table 10. The definitions
for and the statistics for the independent variables
are also shown. Spearman rank correlations be-
tween the dependent variables range from a low of
.336 to a high of .864 with all being significant at
the 1% level. Correlations between the independ-
ent variables are shown in Table 11. There were
several fairly large and significant correlations be-
tween some of the independent variables indicat-
ing a need to test for multicollinearity in the
multivariate model.
Table 11 shows the correlations between the in-
dependent and the dependent continuous variables.
In respect of the dummy variables a Mann-
Whitney test is used (Table 13). Bi-variate testing
provides an initial indication of whether there is
support for the hypotheses.
The first row of Table 12 shows significant cor-
relations between six out of nine of the hypothe-
sised independent variables and the dependent
variable 1-1s. This provides initial support for hy-
potheses H3, H5, H6, H8, H10 and H11. The cor-
relations between the other dependent variables
and the independent variables provide support for
hypotheses H5, H6, H10 and H11.
Table 13 provides support for hypothesis H1 as
companies with foreign stock exchange listings
hold a significantly higher number of one-to-ones
and have a larger audience for meetings. There is
less support for hypotheses H7a (HIGHMTBV)
and H7b (LOWMTBV) and H9 (HIGHTECH)
apart from the fact that companies with a low
MTBV seem to be associated with higher values 
of the dependent variables with three significant
results.
As there was no support for the MTBV hypoth-
esis H7 using the continuous variable MTBV but
some support for H7b it was decided to use the
dummy variables in the multiple regression 
instead.
Table 14 shows the model for the dependent
variable one-to-one meetings (1-1s). In view of the
distributional properties of some of the variables a
normal scores approach as suggested by Cooke
(1998) was used for the continuous dependent and
independent variables. Regression diagnostics
showed that multicollinearity and heteroscedastic-
ity were not a problem. The results indicate that
the number of institutional investors (INSTNO),
analyst following (ANALYST) and raising of cap-
ital (NEWCAP) are significant explanatory vari-
ables in the model. Comparing these results with
those studies of investor relations activity reported
in Table 1 it appears that institutional ownership
was also significant for Tasker (1998) and Bushee
et al. (2003) but not for Rao and Sivakumar
(1999). Analyst following was significant for
Tasker (1998), Frankel et al. (1999) and Bushee 
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11 To put this figure in context, Briton’s Index (PR Newswire,
2003) provides a listing of stockbrokers’ addresses. There are
117 addresses of UK headquarters offices and 200 branch of-
fices. The directory lists 7,600 named analysts and executive
personnel. Marston (1993: 68–72) noted that there were around
2,000–3,000 equity analysts working in the UK in 1990.
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42 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
Table 10
The variables
Standard
Dependent variables Minimum Maximum Mean Median deviation N
1-1s 2 600 76.77 50.00 78.824 128
SSA-ATT 0 170 32.69 20.00 28.821 124
SSA-LIST 3 552 47.09 25.00 73.665 117
SB-FIRMS 2 232 23.88 15.50 29.656 96
BSA-ATT 2 1000 81.04 50.00 120.987 117
BSA-LIST 5 2000 146.55 60.00 241.336 113
II-FIRMS 2 500 60.79 40.00 73.102 92
Independent variables
F-F% (H2) .240 1.000 .89018 1.00000 .172780 114
BFA% (H3) 0 79 3.24 0.00 9.860 141
INST% (H4) 33.7 100 79.297 81.463 11.9113 143
INSTNO (H5) 35 173 97.44 94.00 33.832 143
ANALYST (H6) 1.00 31.67 6.5745 6.0000 4.59729 141
MTBV (H7) –405.72 46.7 –3.99 1.88 47.653 142
IA/TOTA (H8) .00 .86 .1875 .0737 .22538 141
NEWCAP (£k) (H10) –9000 833000 34772.71 1866.00 116197.441 139
Size
MKTCAP (£m) (H11) 162.9 123714.4 4886.87 1045.58 12843.8478 143
Dummy variables Dummy=1 Dummy=0
FLIST (H1) 40 103 143
HIGHMTBV (H7) 28 114 142
LOWMTBV (H7) 114 28 142
HIGHTECH (H9) 25 118 143
1-1s = no. of one-to-one meetings in past 12m.
SSA-ATT = no. of sell-side analysts attending meetings of all types in past 12m.
SSA-LIST = no. of sell-side analysts on invitation list.
SB-FIRMS = no. of stock-broking firms sending representatives to meetings of all types in past 12m.
BSA-ATT = no. of buy-side analysts and fund managers/institutional investors attending meetings of all types in
past 12m.
BSA-LIST = no. of buy-side analysts and fund managers/institutional investors on invitation list.
II-FIRMS = no. of institutional investor firms sending representatives to meetings of all types in past 12m.
F-F% = Free-float, Datastream datatype STXFF as at 31 December 2001.
BFA% = percentage of shares owned by the board, family and their associates from Crawford’s Directory of City
Connections (Crawford’s, 2002).
INST% = % held by institutions with a lower cut off point of a 0.1% holding from the Citywatch database.17
INSTNO = The number of institutions making up INST%.
ANALYST= Analyst holding, I/B/E/S Datastream datatype F1NE, the number of estimates associated with a fis-
cal year 1 forecast (average for the 3 years prior to the survey).
MTBV = Market-to-book, Datastream datatype MTBV at the 31st December 2001.18
IA/TOTA = Intangible assets ratio, Datastream company accounts items 344 total intangibles over 392 total assets.
NEWCAP = Worldscope cash flow datatype (W04251) ‘Net proceeds from sale/issue common and preferred
stock’ at 31/12/01.
MKTCAP = the market capitalisation in the Financial Times UK 500 (Financial Times, 2001).
FLIST = US listing or any foreign listing, FLIST19 obtained from the questionnaire.
HIGHMTBV = top quintile of values of MTBV.
LOWMTBV = bottom quintile of values of MTBV.
HITECH = High tech industry, FTSE World Actuaries Sector codes aerospace and defence (21), electronic equip-
ment (253), pharmaceuticals (48), IT hardware and software (93) and computer services (97).
17 Data in Citywatch is compiled at quarterly (or sometimes less frequent) intervals but on different days. Therefore data
was taken at the date nearest to the first mailing of the questionnaire, usually this was within one month of the mailing date.
18 This is the market capitalisation divided by the net tangible assets. The net tangible assets can be small or even nega-
tive leading to extreme values in some cases. Rees (1995: 94) provides a discussion of the problem of negative numbers and
small divisors in the context of accounting ratios and notes that removal of outliers, transformation and use of non-para-
metric statistics can be used to cope with the problem. Rather than remove outliers I consider that these data items contain
information and arise for genuine reasons so transformation and/or non parametric statistics are used.
19 There were only four companies with no US listing but with other foreign listings. Thus is was not possible to test
whether there was a difference between the two groups.
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44 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
Table 13
Summary of results of bi-variate tests of dependent variable and independent dummy variables
Dummy variable FLIST HIGHMTBV LOWMTBV HIGHTECH
H1 H7a H7b H9
Expected direction + + + +
Dependent variables
1-1s √ ** √ √ √
SSA-ATT √ ** √
SSA-LIST √ ** √
SB-FIRMS √ ** √ ^ √
BSA-ATT √ ** √ √
BSA-LIST √ ** √ √ ^
II-FIRMS √ ** √ √ ** √
√ relationship between the two variables is in the expected direction
** significant at the .01 level, ^ significant at the .1 level, two-tail tests
See Table 10 for definitions of the variables.
Table 14
The number of one-to-one meetings: the model using OLS regression
Expected direction
Dependent variable 1-1s1
Adjusted R Square .470
Constant –.253 (–.2351)*
FLIST (H1) + .311 (1.766)^
F-F%2 (H2) +
BFA% (H3) – –.149 (–1.659)^
INST% (H4) + –.083 (–1.179)
INSTNO (H5) + .267 (2.186)*
ANALYST (H6) + .337 (3.055)**
HIGHMTBV (H7) + .407 (2.142)*
LOWMTBV (H7) + .347 (1.823)^
IA/TOTA (H8) + .074 (0.861)
HIGHTECH (H9) + .140 (0.715)
NEWCAP (H10) + .251 (2.959)**
MKTCAP (H11) + –.126 (–0.836)
Cases 123
1 t-values in parentheses, ** significant at the .01 level,* significant at the .05 level, ^ significant at the .1 level.
Dependent variables and continuous independent variables have been converted to normal scores.
2 There were several missing values for F-F% and it was not significant in the bi-variate test nor when the full
model was tested so it has been omitted.
See Table 10 for definitions of the variables.
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et al. (2003). Raising of new capital was signifi-
cant for Tasker (1998) and Gelb (2000) but not for
Frankel et al. (1999) or Rao and Sivakumar
(1999). The existence of a foreign listing is signif-
icant at the 0.1 level (in agreement with Marston,
1993, Table 1). Both the high and low MTBV
dummies are significant. Tasker (1998) and
Frankel et al. (1999) found MTBV to be signifi-
cant whereas Bushee et al. (2003) did not. It is sur-
prising that size is not significant although Bushee
et al. (2003) had a similar result but the other six
studies summarised in Table 1 found that size was
significant.
The adjusted r-square is .470 and this is reason-
able. It should be borne in mind that the dependent
variables figure is an estimate, probably quite a
rough round sum estimate, provided by the survey
respondents.
Table 15 shows a summary of the results of the
regression using the three dependent variables
representing the audience of sell-side analysts.
The adjusted r-square is higher in these models
than in Table 14. Regression diagnostics indicat-
ed that multicollinearity was not a problem. The
results indicate that company size (MKTCAP)
and analyst following (ANALYST) are the main
factors driving the size of the actual and potential
audience of sell-side analysts. The ratio of intan-
gible assets to total assets (IA/TOTA) also ap-
pears to be an important factor. There is an
unexpected negative relationship between the
level of institutional ownership (INST%) and the
dependent variables which is only significant in
one of the regressions.
Table 15 also shows a summary of the results of
the regression using the three dependent variables
representing the audience of buy-side analysts and
institutional investors. The models are less suc-
cessful in terms of goodness of fit and consistency
between the results. There does appear to be sup-
port for a positive association between listing sta-
tus (FLIST) and two out of three of the dependent
variables and in common with the results in 
Table 14 size (MKTCAP) does not seem to be a
significant variable.
Overall the results of the multivariate analysis
indicate that different aspects of the investor rela-
tions activity level are determined by different in-
dependent variables. In particular there may be
additional explanatory variables, not included in
the model, which could better explain the variation
in size of the buy-side audience. A further subdivi-
sion of the buy-side audience by fund type might
be worth investigating. This provides an avenue
for further research and it would be desirable to
collect larger data sets from companies to improve
the analysis. Other measures of investor relations
activity level could also be developed.
6. Conclusions and discussion
This paper adds to our understanding of the in-
vestor relations process. Investor relations activi-
ties and actions are a special kind of disclosure and
the literature review indicates that while there is no
all-embracing theory of investor relations, a useful
explanatory framework is available. I develop a
two-dimensional dynamic model for investor rela-
tions that leads to several research questions
(RQ1–RQ5). In order to answer these questions I
use survey questionnaire data direct from compa-
ny insiders collected at two points in time.
The descriptive results show that investor rela-
tions meetings (of all types) are an important part
of the financial reporting and business communi-
cation package offered by companies to their 
institutional investors and to analysts (RQ1). One-
to-one meetings are ranked as the most important
investor relations communication channel in 2002
as they were in 1991 (Table 2) (RQ1).
The results show that most companies keep
records for internal purposes of various types of
investor relations meeting and that this record
keeping has increased since 1991 (RQ1). This en-
ables them to prepare better for future meetings
and protect themselves against allegations of se-
lective release of price sensitive information.
The results also show that company respondents
are favourably inclined towards the holding of in-
vestor relations meetings and corresponding by
telephone (Table 5). The comparative data shows
that these opinions have remained stable over the
period 1991 to 2002 (RQ2).
The respondents largely agree that investor rela-
tions meetings demonstrate the quality of the man-
agement team (Table 5) (RQ2). This is in
agreement with Healy and Palepu’s (2001) man-
agement-talent signalling hypothesis. However the
question then arises: if investor relations meetings
create an impression of high management quality
does it follow that managers are actually perform-
ing well or could the impression be false? Enron
was highly rated for its management before the 
debacle. This is an area for further research.
Respondents agreed that investor relations did
have a market outcome (RQ2) in terms of fairer
pricing and improved market liquidity. These per-
ceptions are broadly in agreement with empirical
research into market outcomes of investor rela-
tions in the US. However there is a case for a more
in-depth survey of respondents’ views on specific
market outcomes along with UK based empirical
studies of actual market outcomes. It would be 
desirable to investigate the effect of the investor
relations effort on variables such as analyst fol-
lowing and forecast accuracy as has been done in
the US. To do this empirically it would be desir-
able to have objective, standardised measures of
investor relations activity, including meetings,
Vol. 38 No. 1. 2008 45
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available for a large population of listed compa-
nies over a period of time.
Respondents discuss various aspect of past per-
formance at investor relations meetings and the
importance ratings of these items had remained
stable over time (Table 6) (RQ 3). Discussion of
future prospects includes discussion of various as-
pects of company strategy with similar importance
ratings obtained in 2002 and 1991 (Table 7) for the
different items. Thus it appears that the agenda at
investor relations meetings has not changed radi-
cally over the period 1991 to 2002. Table 8 pres-
ents data new to this study and shows that creation
of shareholder value was the most highly rated
item of discussion from a list of topical manage-
ment issues.
I find that larger companies tend to rank investor
relations as being more important than smaller
companies (RQ 4) in accordance with expectations
based on prior empirical research.
The demand for one-to-one meetings is high and
has increased since 1991 (Table 9). It appears that
analysts and investors still require the personal
touch and these meetings may be a response to
market failure concerning the disclosure of diffi-
cult-to-articulate information.
The size of the audience invited to and attending
meetings is substantial and shows an upward trend
between 1991 and 2002 (Table 9). Although the fi-
nancial report plays a central role in corporate
communications (Holland, 1998: 264), meetings
provide an opportunity for private discussions de-
spite the regulatory issues. The ICAEW (2007)
comment that ‘UK shareholders are more collegial
in their engagement than their US counterparts’
and in particular ‘the UK regulatory environment
permits dialogue between boards and investors by
not presuming that such dialogue represents privi-
leged disclosure which is restricted by regulation
Fair Disclosure in the US’ (ICAEW, 2007: 12).
I explain the differing investor relations activity
levels between companies by using a regression
model derived from the literature (RQ5). I obtain
seven proxies for investor relations activity level
from the survey data. These measures are not
available from external sources and this is a unique
feature of this study. I hypothesise that ownership
structure, dispersion of ownership, and institution-
al ownership will be positively related to the in-
vestor relations activity level. I also expect that
46 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
Table 15
The audience for investor relations meetings of all types: summary results of the model using 
OLS regression
Expected Sell-side audience Buy-side audience
direction
Dependent SSA- SSA- SB- BSA- BSA- II-
variable ATT LIST FIRMS ATT LIST FIRMS
Adjusted R Square .640 .506 .593 .342 .411 .465
Direction of relationship and significance level1
Constant – – + – – ** – **
FLIST (H1) + + + ^ + + + ** + **
BFA% (H3) – – + – – – +
INST% (H4) + – ** – – ** + – – ^
INSTNO(H5) + – – * – + ^ + +
ANALYST (H6) + + ** + ** + ** + + –
HIGH-MTBV (H7) + – – ^ – + + +
LOWMTBV (H7) + – – + ^ + + + **
IA/TOTA (H8) + + ** + * + + – –
HIGH-TECH (H9) + – – – + + +
NEWCAP (H10) + – + + + + ** +
MKTCAP (H11) + + ** + ** + ** + + +
Cases 119 114 92 112 109 87
See Table 10 for definitions of the variables.
1 ** significant at the .01 level, * significant at the .05 level, ^ significant at the .1 level. Dependent variables
and continuous independent variables have been converted to normal scores.
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firms with higher analyst following, firms with a
complex disclosure environment and firms that
raise capital will have a higher investor relations
activity level. I also control for size. The multi-
variate analysis tested the 11 hypotheses proposed
in the regression model. It showed that the number
of one-to-one meetings increased with analyst fol-
lowing (H6), the number of institutional investors
(H5) and also with issuance of share capital (H10).
Additionally foreign listings (H1) and extreme
values of MTBV (H7) appeared to have some im-
pact although this was less well-supported. Free-
float (H2), insider holdings (H3), the level of
institutional ownership (H4), intangible assets
(H8), membership of a high-tech industry (H9)
and size (H11) were not significant in the model.
Thus while only five out of 11 hypotheses received
support this is not inconsistent with prior studies.
For example Frankel et al. (1999) found support
for five out of 13 of the variables in their model.
The regression model results showed that com-
pany size (H11) and analyst following (H6) are the
main explanatory factors driving the size of the au-
dience of sell-side analysts with some support for
the influence of intangible assets (H8). In respect
of the audience of buy-side analysts and fund man-
agers there was support for foreign listing (H1)
being an important explanatory factor but the re-
sults indicate the need for a different model for this
aspect of investor relations activity.
The availability of comparative data enables the
impact of change drivers to be assessed. The re-
sults show that levels of investor relations activity
as proxied by seven variables have increased over
the period (RQ5) whereas opinions and percep-
tions have remained fairly stable over time at the
aggregate level for the two populations (RQ1,2,3).
Increases in the activity level variables (Table 9)
range from 30% to 210% indicating steady growth
rather than an order of magnitude change. The lack
of drastic change might seem somewhat surprising
in view of the growth of the investor relations in-
dustry as evidenced by some of the empirical stud-
ies noted in the literature review. On the other hand
Gibbins et al. (1990: 130) have established that
managers may adhere to norms in respect of dis-
closure, subject to other factors.
In this paper the statistical analysis using single
equation regression takes a cross sectional ap-
proach and both intuitively and from the two-
dimensional dynamic model derived from the lit-
erature review (Figure 1) I expect that changes in
some of the variables could affect investor rela-
tions activity level.12 This is another possible area
for further research.
The traditional agency theory perspective on dis-
closure may be less applicable to ‘soft’ investor re-
lations disclosures than it is to disclosure via hard
copy annual reports. Although this is a mainly
quantitative study I note that theorising in this area
is moving forward as a result of the contributions
of qualitative researchers using interviews
(Holland, 1997, 1998; Roberts et al., 2006). The
literature shows that sophisticated investor rela-
tions is expected to lead to benefits in capital mar-
kets. This study of investor relations meetings
should provide additional insights for those work-
ing in the area of market-based accounting re-
search and for those following the qualitative
route.
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